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A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR NORTH
CAROLINA
M. T. VAN

HECCE*

For the first time since 1868 and for the second time in the history
of the state, North Carolina has been presented with a general revision of her Constitution, subject to the approval of the electorate
2
next November. It is the work' of a Commission of three judges,
3
4
5
four lawyers, an editor and a state fiscal officer, as amended by
the General Assembly of 1933.6 In substance the changes made
by the Commission and the legislature consist of a series of amendments to the basic law now in force. In form these changes have
been synchronized with what remains of the old instrument to make
a new constitution. The entire document will be voted upon as a
whole.
TAXATION
Under the present North Carolina Constitution, the poll tax is
limited to two dollars in the case of the state and one dollar in the
case of cities and towns. The income tax is limited to six per cent.
The total of the state and county tax on property is limited to fifteen
cents, unless levied for a special purpose with the special approval
of the General Assembly and/or unless levied for the six months
school term. All taxation of property except home loans must be by
* Dean of the School of Law, University of North Carolina.
'THE REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL CoMrIssIoN (1932)
may be obtained from the Legislative Reference. Librarian, Raleigh. It wqs
published in full in (1932) 11 N. C. L. REv. 5-50. The Commission was
appointed by Governor 0. Max Gardner, in June. 1931. It organized in
October, 1931, and reported to the Governor November 26, 1932. Its minutes,
which have not been published, include some 400 pages of reports of investigations made at the request of the Commission by the law schools of Wake
Forest College, Duke University and the University of North Carolina. Statements made in this paper, where no specific reference to other material is
given, are largely based upon those reports. Charles B. Aycock, of Raleigh,
served as Secretary of the Commission.
2
W. P. Stacy, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of North Carolina, chairman;
John J. Parker,. Senior Circuit Judge, United States Circuit Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit; Michael Schenck, Judge of the Superior Court of North
Carolina.
'George E. Butler, Clinton ; J. 0. Carr, Wilmington; Burton Craige, Winston-Salem; Lindsay Warren, Member of Congress, Washington, N. C.
"Dr. Clarence Poe, The Progressive Farmer, Raleigh.
Allen J. Maxwell, State Revenue Commissioner, Raleigh.
'P. L., 1933, c. 383. This statute embodies the entire proposed new constitution.
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uniform rule and on an ad valorem basis. The proposed new constitution removes all of these limitations and substitutes four new ones:
(1) The taxing power must be exercised in a just and equitable
manner and only for public purposes ;7 (2) local taxes may only be
levied in accordance with general laws and under state supervision of
local budgets and tax levies ;8 (3) taxes for debt service are to be
diminished by new limitations upon the creation of state and local indebtedness ;9 and (4) the Governor is given the veto power 1 ° over all
legislation, including tax laws, not subject to popular vote.
This is not the place to discuss whether all of the present limitations upon taxation have or have not been observed in practice. Nor
is it important to recall that the people in the past have not approved
at the polls proposed constitutional amendments authorizing classification of property for purposes of taxation. For these proposals have
never been coupled with or subjected to a proposed veto power in
the Governor. Nor were they connected with a completely new realignment of the taxing power; they were patches on an already outmoded and distrusted fiscal system. It is, however, important to see
what can be gained by the new provisions, and at what risk.
Under the new arrangement, a relatively unfettered legislature
may, in conjunction with a Governor having the veto power and a
new constitutional responsibility for the biennial budget, more adequately adjust the fiscal policy of the state to meet the needs and the
resources of the state as economic conditions change. With the membership of the legislature elected every two years and a Governor
unable to succeed himself, the General Assembly and the Governor
remain accountable to public opinion for these fiscal policies. This
co-operation between the executive and the legislature will, it is believed, more effectively shape the tax legislation of the future than
rigid, mechanical constitutional limitations imposed by one generation
upon another.
It is simply because these restrictions, such as the requirement
of uniformity upon an ad valorem basis, have become out of joint
with the conditions which have developed since they were put into
the Constitution that they have been removed. A constitutional requirement of uniformity assumes that all property should be treated
'AT.
V, §1. (All references to articles and sections in this paper relate
to 8the proposed new constitution, unless otherwise indicated.)
ART. V, §4.
' See below, under Debt Limitations.
"ART. II, §21.

A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR NORTH CAROLINA

195

alike and that all property can in practice be equally uncovered and
assessed for purposes of taxation. This may have been so in the day
when the life of the state was primarily rural in character. Under
the complex commercial and industrial organization of modern economic life, with numerous new types of property, it never has been
so. Income from investments in stocks and bonds, for example, cannot in fact be discovered, and because the uniform ad valorem tax
would take half or more of the income, the investors do not return it
voluntarily for taxation. And, in the depression, it is impossible
because of the uniformity requirement to afford relief to unproductive property, for example, without similarly relieving every other
form of property, regardless of its ability to pay.
Constitutional requirements of uniformity were inserted in the
state constitutions after the war between the states at a time when
the changes that were already taking place in the business world made
such restrictions wholly artificial. The result in other states has been
a steady march away from the requirement of uniformity and toward
a power in the legislature to adjust taxation to the actual facts. It is
interesting to note that the new proposal for North Carolina is a
throwback to the constitution of 1776, as it remained until the carpetbagger convention of 1868 transplanted a uniformity provision from
one of the middle western states to hamstring the reconstructed legislature of North Carolina. It also parallels the equally free taxing
power of Congress, within its Federal jurisdiction.
The question is not whether North Carolina should immediately
classify property for purposes of taxation. The arguments and the
evidence, pro and con, are too complicated to be discussed in the short
space available here. It is significant, however, that the 1928 Report
of the Tax Commission recommending such a plan and that the Report
of the Constitutional Commission proposing removal of the uniformity requirement, are based on careful studies of these arguments
and of experience in other states. It is also significant that all other
forms of taxation in North Carolina except the property tax, indeed
all of the taxes which support the state government, such as those
upon income, inheritance, sales, licenses and franchises, have long
been levied on a classified basis. Rather, the question is whether we
shall remove a constitutional limitation which forbids the General
Assembly to consider those arguments and data in formulating from
time to time its property tax program. Those who fear that arbitrary and discriminating legislative action may take place under the
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proposed new constitution should keep in mind the fact that the courts
in other states have been able to handle the question whether those
in the same situation have been treated alike, under the due process
and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions.
The new limitation that "the power of taxation shall be exercised in
a just and equitable manner" invokes this protection. That this
will give rise to new legislative and judicial problems of no inconsiderable factual difficulty, is not to be denied. That these difficulties
are not prohibitive is evident from our experience with taxes levied
on sources other than property.
DEBT LIMITATIONS
Debt limitations, under the existing Constitution, are tied up with
the assessed valuation of property for purposes of taxation. Thus,
with certain exceptions not now important, the total state debt is
limited to seven and one-half per cent of the assessed valuation of the
taxable property within the state as last fixed for taxation. Admittedly,
assessed valuation bears too fluctuating a relation to actual value and
is too incomplete to form a basis for debt limitations. The creation
of local indebtedness is limited mainly by the requirement of a popular
vote. The alternative, that the debt or tax must be "for the necessary
expenses". of the county, city or town, simply gives to the courts a
sporadic and delayed veto power. The proposed new constitution
forbids new state and local debts in excess of a certain proportion
of the amount by which the outstanding indebtedness has been reduced, unless authorized by popular vote. In the case of the state,
this proportion is two-thirds of the reduction during the preceding
biennium." In the case of the local communities, it is one-half of
the reduction the previous year.A2 And the majority of the popular
vote by which this limitation can be exceeded in the counties, cities
and towns must be equal to one-fourth of the votes cast in that
county, city, town or municipal corporation, as the case may be, for
Governor at the last gubernatorial election.1 8
These limitations are reflective of the current depression. Certainly they will operate to hold down new debts-not, however, in
proportion to pressing needs which future generations may face, nor
in proportion to the ability of those future generations and their
descendants to pay, but in proportion to the accidental coincidence of
21ART.

V, §2.

-AR.

V, §5.

"ART. V, §..
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maturities of bond issues floated in the past, 14 The amounts of new
debts possible depend not only upon these haphazard maturities but
upon the totals of bonds actually paid. So far as the present writer
knows, this type of debt limitation is not in force in any other state.
As a method of gradually reducing the aggregate old and new indebtedness, the plan is excellent. The only question is whether it
will prove sufficiently elastic to permit of expansion through necessary
borrowing.
This is an unpopular subject now, but we are making a constitution for a long time. The escape from the debt limitation through
popular vote may easily be overrated. The state as a whole will not
approve bond issues unless for a dramatic purpose such as a soldiers'
bonus. The ease, however, of obtaining popular approval within a
particular county, city or town or other municipal corporation for a
bond issue to cover a supposed local need became so notorious that
the Constitutional Commission wisely provided that the majority of
those voting must represent a respectable proportion of the electorate.
It will not be so easy to obtain that degree of popular approval. The
disgraceful spectacle of hundreds of North Carolina local government units in default on their bonds explains too why their future
borrowings are restricted to one-half the debts retired the previous
year, as compared with two-thirds of those retired the previous two
years, on the part of the state. Would it not have been wiser in the
long run to adopt instead a constitutional provision that the debt shall
not exceed a given proportion of the average tax income over a period
of, say, the previous five years? Then the basis would be the ability
and willingness to pay.
THE VETO

North Carolina has long been the only state in the Union to withhold from her Governor the power to veto legislation enacted by the
General Assembly. And the new constitution contains the first proposal for a veto power to come from any legislature, constitutional
convention or commission in the history of the state.
The general scheme of the veto proposal is as follows :15 The veto
is not to be applicable to legislation which has to be submitted to a
u The table of annual maturities up to 1972 published by the State Tax
Commission in its 1932 Report at page 227 shows maturities ranging from
$5,150,000 to $7,185,000 between 1932 and 1947; $4,700,000 in 1949; $8,180,000
in 1950; $3,807,000 in 1951; $1,060,000 in 1963; $11,523,000 in 1964; $50,000
in 1965; and so on.
UART. II, §21.
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vote of the people for adoption. The General Assembly may repass
legislation over the Governor's vote by the vote of a majority of the
entire membership of .each House. If the Governor approves the
general purpose of any bill but disapproves any part or parts thereof,
he may return it with recommendations for its amendments to the
House in which it originated. A majority of the members present
in each House may then dispose of the recommended amendments.
Whether these are adopted or rejected, the bill then goes back to the
Governor and he may act upon it as if it were there before him for
the first time. The vote necessary to overcome a veto and the vote on
suggested amendments must be votes of record. During the session,
the Governor is given five days within which to consider whether to
sign or to veto a bill. If at the end of that time he has done neither,
the bill becomes a law automatically. After adjournment, the Governor is given ten days in which to determine what to do with the bills
passed during the last five days of the session. But he cannot veto
after adjournment any bill presented to him 48 hours before adjournment. If a bill has not been signed or vetoed ten days after adjournment, it automatically becomes a law. The so-called "pocket veto"
has no place in the scheme.
The last state in the Union to consider the adoption of the veto,
North Carolina has been given an opportunity to profit by the experience in other states. The proposed veto provision differs in four
particulars from the constitutions elsewhere, namely, in respect to:
(1) the authorization of the Governor to recommend amendments,
(2) the 48-hour limitation on vetoes after adjournment, (3) the rejection of the item veto, and (4) the vote required to override a veto.
(1) Three states, Alabama, Virginia and Massachusetts, authorize the Governor, in connection with the exercise of the veto power,
to propose amendments to legislation referred to him for approval or
disapproval during the legislative session. In Virginia, the provision
applies when the Governor approves the general purpose of the bill,
but frowns upon a particular part. The bill must then go back to
the Governor, whether the amendment is adopted or not, for approval
or veto. The Alabama and Massachusetts plans differ slightly in
detail. All three of these provisions have been widely praised as desirable affirmative controls of legislation. The North Carolina proposal follows that of Virginia.
(2) The reason for the denial of power to veto after adjournment
bills presented to the Governor 48 hours prior to adjournment is this:
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In Congress and in nearly all of the state legislature§ the great bulk
of the legislation, especially the most controversial legislation, is
enacted during the closing days of the session and does not reach
the chief executive until after adjournment. Actually, therefore, as
to bills enacted in the end-of-the-session rush, the executive veto, in
Congress and in nearly all of the states, is absolute for lack of a
legislature in session to re-enact rejected measures. The limitation
under discussion was probably inserted by the Constitutional Commission to minimize the Governor's exercise of such an absolute veto.
Even if that result is desirable, it is doubtful whether 48 hours is an
adequate time within which a governor may discharge his responsibility. He may desire to secure advice from the Attorney General, to
consult department and institutional executives, to hold public hearings and otherwise to prepare himself for his decision. The Governor
is given such a short period of time as this in no other Constitution.
California, New York and Pennsylvania give him 30 days.
One paragraph of a recent opinion' 6 of Chief Justice Hughes,
upholding a presidential power to veto or sign bills after adjournment, is of interest in connection with the problem now facing North
Carolina:
"Regard must be had to the fundamental purpose of the constitutional provision to provide appropriate opportunity for the President to consider the bills presented to him. The importance of maintaining that opportunity unimpaired increases as bills multiply. The
Attorney General calls attention to the fact that at the time here in
question, that is, between February 28, 1931, and noon of March 4,
1931, 269 bills were presented to the President for his consideration,
184 of which were presented to him during the last twenty-four hours
of the session. No possible reason, either suggested by constitutional
theory or based upon supposed policy, appears for a construction of
the Constitution which would cut down the opportunity of the President to examine and approve bills merely because the Congress had
adjourned. No public interest would be conserved by the requirement of hurried and inconsiderable examination of bills in the closing
hours of a session, with the result that bills may be approved which
on further consideration would be disapproved or may fail although
on such examination they might be found to deserve approval."
(3) In all but ten states the Governor may veto specific items of
appropriation bills. In Massachusetts and California, he may either
veto or reduce such items. The Pennsylvania Governor has this re"' Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 493, 52 Sup. Ct. 627, 76 L. ed.
1239 (1932).
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duction power by virtue of judicial construction of the item veto
clause. In North Carolina, by statute, the Governor and Budget
Commission may reduce appropriations to meet the revenue at
any time during the biennium. In Washington and South Carolina,
the Governor's veto extends to any section or any part of any bill.
A similar provision was withdrawn in Ohio in 1912 after nine years'
experience. No provision for an item veto has been made by
the Constitutional Commission. During the session, the proposed
power of the Governor to submit amendments would enable him thus
to suggest modifications in particular appropriation items. But the
trouble is that the appropriation bill is usually passed just at the close
of the session.
(4) The veto provision adopted by the Commission required a
vote of "two-thirds of that House" to override a veto. The General
Assembly, adopting Dr. Clarence Poe's alternative suggestion, changed
this to read: "a majority of the entire membership of that House".
Here lies one of the principal storm areas relating to the new constitution. With all mechanical restrictions upon taxation removed
and with the veto the only substitute limitation, a number of people
fear this apparent weakening of the effectiveness of the veto. It is
true that the new provision is found in but a few states. Thirty-four
states require a two-thirds vote to overcome a veto. In twelve of
these that means two-thirds of those present and voting; twenty-two
require two-thirds of the membership. Five others require a threefifths vote. Only one speaks of three-fifths of those voting; four
require three-fifths of the membership. Only eight states require
a bare majority. One of these specifies a majority of those voting;
seven require a majority of the membership. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, New .Jersey, Tennessee and
West Virginia. The proposed new North Carolina provision falls
in this latter group.
Instead, however, of apparently weakening the veto by a drop in
the number of votes required to override it from two-thirds to a
majority, the General Assembly may have strengthened it by raising
this vote from two-thirds of those present and voting if there is a
quorum to a majority of the entire membership, or from 41 to 61
in the House and from 18 to 26 in the Senate. This view, however.
is not altogether free from difficulty. The Commission demonstrated
that it knew the difference between the total membership and the
members present and voting. In connection with overruling the veto,
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the Commission spoke of "two-thirds of that House." In the same
paragraph, in connection with approval of gubernatorial amendments,
the Commission spoke of "a vote of a majority of the members
present in each". By "two-thirds of that House" the Commission,
therefore, might by contrast be held to have intended to say two-thirds
of the membership of that House. On the other hand, Judge John J.
Parker, a member of the Commission, has stated 1" that "The recommendation of the Commission was that the veto power of the Governor might be overridden only by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of
the legislative branch, as in the case of the Constitution of the United
States." The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the
phrase, "two-thirds of that House", in the Federal Constitution means
two-thirds of those present and voting if there is a quorum and not
two-thirds of the entire membership.' 8 The Supreme Court of South
Carolina has made the same construction of a similar requirement in
the Constitution of that state.' 9 And the Supreme Court of North
Carolina has stated arguendo that the phrase, "three-fifths of each
House", in Article 13, Section 2 of our present Constitution relating
to legislative submission of amendments means three-fifths of those
present and voting if there is a quorum and not three-fifths of the
entire membership. 20 Perhaps these are among the reasons for Judge
Parker's additional statement :21 "When it is considered that the twothirds provision permits the overriding of the veto by two-thirds of
those voting, whereas the proposed provision requires a majority of
the actual membership, it will be seen that there is little difference in
the two proposals."
As a matter of fact, the significance of the change from "twothirds of that House" to "a majority of the entire membership of that
House" will depend upon the number present and voting. On ordinary legislative measures, this is unpredictable. On tax measures,
with a record vote required, and with an aroused public interest forcing legislative attention, there is likely to be a pretty full attendance,
even though the members have scattered to their homes before the
veto message is delivered. Say there are 100 present and voting in
'Address, The Proposed Constitution (1933) 35
133, 141.

REPo RTs

N. C. BAR Assoc.

' Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U. S. 276, 39 Sup. Ct. 93, 63 L. ed. 239

(1919); note (1919) 2 A. L. R. 1593.
" Smith v. Jennings, 67 S.C. 324, 45 S. E. 821 (1903).

' Cleveland Cotton Mills v. Commissioners of Cleveland County, 108 N. C.

678, 13 S. E. 271 (1891).
'Supra, note 17.
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the House and 40 in the Senate, when the question arises of overriding
the veto. Under the Commission's reported provision, 67 votes would
have been required in the House; now 61 will suffice. In the Senate
27 would have been required; now 26 will suffice. The effectiveness
of the veto then would have been weakened to that extent.
There need be no serious fear, however, of the prospect of a majority of the entire membership overriding a gubernatorial veto. With
the legislators elected every two years and a Governor unable to
succeed himself, the General Assembly and the governor are directly
accountable to public opinion for their acts. The North Carolina
governorship has increased enormously in authority and in prestige.
Against the effects upon public opinion of a Governor's veto message,
publicized through the press and the radio, it will be a desperate opposition which can muster 61 votes in the House and 26 in the Senate.
And if it can, that decision ought to prevail if representative government is to continue.
In any event, the veto will serve as a check upon hastily drafted
and ill-advised legislation. Much of the obviously unconstitutional
special legislation now enacted by every legislature can be stopped at
the source immediately, instead of in the courts years later, by vetoes
based upon Attorney General's opinions. And constitutional authority
for the Governor's active participation in law making will assure the
effectiveness of his leadership and will bring the executive and the
legislative departments into a closer relationship.
THE JUDICIARY
The adjustability of the business of the judiciary has been facilitated by six changes, as follows: (1) The General Assembly is authorized to increase the number of Supreme Court justices and of
Superior Court judges. 22 (2) The General Assembly is given power
23
to create solicitorial districts distinct from the judicial districts.
(3) The constitutional necessity for the Justice of the Peace has been
removed. (4) The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is given an
executive control of the distribution of the facilities of the Superior
Court, 24 a power now exercised by the Governor. (5) A council
of the Supreme Court justices and of the Superior Court judges is
authorized to regulate the practice and procedure of the courts, 2 5 a
= ART. IV, §§3, 6.

2

= ART. IV, §10.

1 ART.

AlT. IV, §6.
IV, §8.
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function now in the hands of the legislature. (6) The Supreme Court
26
is authorized to sit in divisions.
(1, 2, 3). Under the present Constitution, the Supreme Court's
membership is limited to five, the Chief Justice and four associate
justices. The Court is obviously overburdened. The new provision
would permit additional associate justiceships as conditions may
warrant without resort to constitutional amendment but by legislative action. At present, the General Assembly is free to increase the
number of Superior Court judges, but only through the creation of
additional judicial districts "for each of which a judge shall be
chosen". And, under another section of the present Constitution, "a
solicitor shall be elected for each judicial district." Thus new judgeships mean the automatic creation of new solicitorships, regardless of
need. Hence the proposal enabling solicitorial districts to meet the
demand for prosecuting officers separately and without reference to
the condition of the civil docket. This proposal has been before the
voters for adoption as a constitutional amendment several times in
recent years but has failed each time, largely because of the lack of a
systematic effort to interest the public. If the number of Superior
Court judges could have been easily increased back in 1919 and since,
the state might have been spared the haphazard growth of legislation
setting up Municipal Recorder's Courts, General County Courts, Civil
County Courts, County Civil Courts, District County Courts, County
Criminal Courts and various other local courts, whose jurisdiction in
large measure has duplicated that of the Superior Court and from
whose decisions under Rhyne v. Lipscombe2 7 appeals have first had
to go to the Superior Court. These complications of an originally
simple judicial system have given rise to unnecessary jurisdictional
questions, expense, double appeals, delay and inefficiency. To some
extent these new courts have been the result of dissatisfaction with
the constitutionally necessary Justice of the Peace. That the framers
of the new constitution hoped to encourage a general overhauling by
the General Assembly of the courts inferior to the Superior Court is
evident not only from the elimination of the Justice of the Peace as
a constitutional officer but also from these new provisions :28 "The
General Assembly shall provide by general laws for the creation and
jurisdiction of courts inferior to the Superior Courts with appeals
"ART. IV, §3.
l122 N. C. 650, 29 S. E. 57 (1898).

-ART.

IV, §9.
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therefrom to the Superior Courts; but shall pass no special or local
laws with relation to such courts. Courts of special or limited jurisdiction now existing in North Carolina, including courts of Justices
of the Peace, shall be continued until otherwise provided by the
General Assembly as a result of the passage of General Laws under
this section."
(4) The shift from the Governor to the Chief Justice of the power
to assign Superior Court judges in aid or in lieu of the judge regularly assigned to a particular district because of the illness or incapacity of the latter or when the public interest so requires, is a
commendable step toward a unified judicial system under the executive
direction of the Chief Justice. This development will be further
strengthened by the functioning of the new Judicial Council, presently
to be noted as to its rule-making powers. If the example of the
Federal Judicial Conference and the judicial councils in various states
be followed, much can be accomplished in the direction of a more
efficient dispatch of judicial business by co-operative judges under
the leadership of an enterprising Chief Justice.
(5) The transfer from the General Assembly to a Judicial Council
of the power 29 "to make, alter and amend all rules relating to pleading, practice and procedure in the several courts of the state except in
the Supreme Court, the practice and procedure of which shall be
prescribed by the rules of the Court," will provoke much discussion
from the bar. Heretofore, the General Assembly has been doing
this under a constitutional provision that it "shall .. . regulate by

law when necessary the methods of proceeding in the exercise of
their powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court." And each
biennial session has produced a patchwork of unrelated and ill-planned
changes in the detail of judicial practice and procedure. The Supreme
Court, however, has handled its own rules well. The argument in
favor of the new plan is obvious. Two or three objections may be
noted. That the Supreme Court has been unwilling to revise upward
its rules relating to standards for admission to the bar, with the result
that the General Assembly of 1933 transferred this power to the
new incorporated State Bar,30 is not an argument against the proposed regulation of practice and procedure by judicial rule-making,
for there the Court was dealing with the semi-political issue of educational policy affecting entrance to the legal profession and not with
the machinery of court administration. Nor should the fact that the
0 ART. IV, §8.

'

P. L., 1933, c. 210, 331.
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1931 General Assembly felt called upon to abolish the old statutory
judicial Conference 3l deter the adoption of the new constitution. That
Conference was too large and unwieldy. It included the justices of
of the Supreme Court and the Superior Court judges, who are to constitute the new Council, but it also included the Attorney General and
32
one practicing lawyer from edch of the twenty judicial districts.
Its powers were entirely advisory and the General Assembly largely
ignored its recommendations. The new Council has direct legislative
power. If criticisms of the work of the old Conference were justified, they do not carry over to the potentialities of a wholly responsible, self-governing judiciary. Moreover, the Conference was abolished under a 'mistaken notion that the new Law Improvement Commission38 created by the General Assembly of 1931 was designed
to do the same job. Nor should the failure of some ten appellate
courts to exercise to any great extent rule-making powers conferred
either by constitutional provision or by statute, discourage us. For
the successful exercise of such powers by the High Court of Justice
in England, by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Equity
Rules of 1912, and by such state courts as those in Connecticut and
New Jersey indicate what can be accomplished when the judges having the power take their duties seriously.34
(6) Similarly, the bar will be greatly interestea in the proposed
.authority to the Supreme Court to sit in divisions. This provision
reads as follows :35 "The Supreme Court shall have power to sit in
divisions, when in its judgment this is necessary for the proper dispatch of business, and to make rules for the distribution of business
between the divisions and for the hearing of cases by the full Court.
No decision of any division shall become the judgment of the Court
unless concurred in by three justices ;36 and no case involving a construction of the Constitution of this State or of the United States
shall be decided except by the Court in banc. All sessions of the
Court shall be held in the City of Raleigh." The Constitutional ComaP. L., 1931, c. 451.
- P. L., 1925, c. 244.
' P. L. 1931, c. 98.
" See DODD, STATE GOVERNMENT (2d ed., 1928) 337-338.
MART. IV, §3.

If the membership of the Court is increased to seven, decisions of a
minority of three will then become the judgment of the Court. This, however,
is not because of a clerical error. Rather, with the administration of the divisional plan subject to the Court's own rules and the executive control of the
Chief Justice, it was believed that the unanimous decision of a division should
prevail.
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mission adopted this provision after study of the experience under
similar plans in other states. Fortunately, the data considered by the
Commission are available to the bar in the June, 1932, issue of this
Review,3 7 and need not be repeated here. Authorized either by constitutional provision or by statute in Alabama, California, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Virginia and Washington, the plan has been
rejected only in California, Kansas, Louisiana and Oklahoma. The
reason for this rejection in California centered around the availability there of intermediate appellate courts. Oklahoma has never
tried the plan. After its use for several years had enabled the Court
to catch up with its docket, Kansas and Louisiana abandoned it, because of dissatisfaction by the bar. But the reports from the ten
other states indicate not only that the divisional court plan is working
effectively but that both lawyers and judges commend it.
Unfortunately, the General Assembly so modified the Commission's proposed new constitution as to deprive future .legislatures
of the power to consider whether in their discretion it might not be
appropriate at some future time to make five other changes in the
judicial system: (1) The Commission38s made the rotation of judges
among the judicial districts optional with the General Assembly and
eliminated the old prohibition against a judge's holding court in any
one county oftener than once in four years. The General Assembly39
deprived its successors of power to abolish rotation of judges and
restored the old four-year limitation. (2) The Commission 40 required
indictments by a grand jury only in capital cases and authorized the
legislature to provide otherwise for offenses less than capital. The
General Assembly 41 required grand jury indictments in all felonies,
and authorized the legislature to provide otherwise only in misdemeanors. (3) The Commission eliminated all references to the
sex of jurors. The General Assembly 42 i'estored the present provision
requiring juries in criminal cases to consist of "good and lawful
men". (4) The Commission 43 required unanimous jury verdicts only
in capital cases. For lesser offenses, the General Assembly could
"authorize trial by the judge in cases where the defendant waives
jury trial, and may permit a verdict upon less than a unanimous vote
"Sharp, Supreme Courts Sitting in Divisions (1932) 10 N. C. L. REv.
351.
R PoRT, ART.

ART. IV,

§6.

IV, §6.

REPORT, ART. I, §9.

' ART, I, §9.
'ART. I, §10.

' REPORT, ART.

I, §10.
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of the jurors." The General Assembly 44 changed these provisions
so as to require unanimous verdicts in all criminal cases except petty
misdemeanors, and eliminated the clause relating to trial by the
judge in the event of a jury waiver. (5) The Commission4 5 authorized the General Assembly to provide for verdicts of less than
a unanimous vote of the jurors in civil cases, but the legislature's
redraft 46 deprived future General Assemblies of that power. It is a
curious commentary upon democratic institutions that one legislature
should so distrust its successors. However, if the new constitution is
adopted, the state will not be harmed by these conservative restrictions
upon the Commission's daring; at the most, we have lost only the opportunity to experiment.
LocAL GOVERNMENT

The organization and management of local government have been
made the province of statute law. There is no separate article in the
proposed new constitution, as there is in the present, on Municipal
Corporations. The provisions of the Judicial Department article of
the old Constitution establishing the offices of sheriff and coroner
have been dropped. That the General Assembly is to control local
budgets and tax levies by general laws has already been noted, as
have the proposed new sections transferring to the legislature the control of local courts and the fate of the Justice of the Peace. Substantially the only self-executing constitutional regulation of local
government remaining in the new instrument is that previously discussed, imposing limitations upon new local indebtedness. Instead,
taking their cue from Article 8, Section 4 of the old Constitution,
the framers of the new basic law have proposed :4 "The General
Assembly shall provide by general laws for the organization and government of counties, cities, towns, and other municipal corporations,
but shall pass no special or local law relating thereto. Optional plans
for the organization and government of counties, cities and towns
may be provided by law, to be effective when submitted to the legal
voters thereof and approved by a majority of those voting thereon."
Some have thought that these changes will sweep away a constitutional status heretofore enjoyed by counties and townships, and by
sheriffs, coroners, treasurers, registers of deeds, surveyors, county
commissioners, and township officers. Except as to sheriffs and coro"ART. I, §10.
I REPORT, ART.

I, §16.

"8ART.

"ART.

I, §16.
II,§18.
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ners, this is a misapprehension. For the last section of the old article
on Municipal Corporations authorized the legislature "to modify,
change or abrogate any and all of the provisions of this article, and
substitute others in their place, except sections seven, nine and thirteen." And the courts have held that this could be accomplished by
local and special laws. 48 The exempted sections required a public
vote on local debts except for necessary expenses; required local taxes
to be levied uniformly and on an ad valorem basis; and prohibited
payment of debts incurred in aid of "the rebellion". These items
have been disposed of by other provisions of the new constitution,
most of which have already been noted in this paper. Thus, the new
instrument does away with the incongruity of a tentative constitutional status for local government, subject to piece-meal legislative
action, and puts the whole matter directly into the hands of the General Assembly. If it can overcome the deeply intrenched vested interests of the local government officers, the General Assembly will now
be free to set up and to modify from time to time a system of local
government more responsive to the social and economic conditions of
today and of the future.
Local government will be directly affected by several new limitations upon the power of the General Assembly to pass special and
local legislation. The curse of the excessive bulk of this sort of statute law enacted by the North Carolina General Assembly has not
been so much that it substantially invades the time that ought to be put
on state-wide law making, for everyone knows that these special and
local bills are passed perfunctorily while the two Houses are marking time waiting for committee reports, often in a skeleton session
safeguarded by an agreement that no one will raise the question of a
quorum. Rather, the evil has been that many important problems
of local government are delegated by the responsible local officers not
to the General Assembly, but in practical effect to the particular
county's delegation in the House and Senate. The new changes, although in the writer's opinion not as extensive as they might have
been, will go far to remedy this situation, first, by removing some
of the opportunity and necessity for special and local legislation; second, by substituting state administrative control for legislative action
where adjustability is needed; and, third, by making enforcement of
constitutional limitations more effective through the application of
the veto. This whole matter has been discussed in detail in the
So. Audit Co. v. McKenzie, 147 N. C. 461, 61 S. E. 283 (1908).
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February, 1933, issue of this Review.49 Two or three illustrations
will suffice here: (1) The new constitutionally created State Board
of Education is to have complete charge of the school system, and
50 "to divide the state into a convenient number of school districts
is
without regard to township or county lines." Presumably, the new
clause removes this function from the General Assembly, which is
still, as formerly, to be without power to pass any special or local
legislation "establishing or changing the lines of school districts."
(2) The old Constitution banned such legislation "relating to the
establishment of courts inferior to the Superior Court." The courts
held that this did not prohibit special legislation which modified a particular local court's jurisdiction. The new provision 51 says that
the General Assembly "shall pass no special or local laws with relation to such courts." (3) The old Constitution specifically authorized
special legislation expressing legislative approval of county property
taxes in excess of the constitutional rate of fifteen cents on the hundred when levied for special purposes. By judicial construction, it
permitted, as has been seen, special legislation relating to the items
dealt with in the article on Municipal Corporations. These sections
have been omitted from the new instrument. 2 Instead, special and
local legislation relating to the organization and government of counties, cities, towns and municipal corporations is forbidden, and general
laws are required on the subject of local budgets and tax levies. 53
Originally, the Constitutional Commission5 4 set up a permanent administrative agency to supervise local taxation and finance, somewhat
similar to the Local Government Commission. The General Assembly
"Spruill, The Proposed Constitution and Private, Special and Local Legis-

lation in North Carolina (1933) 11 N. C.L. Rav. 140. This article was printed

before the legislature's amendments of the Commission's proposed constitution were enacted. Thus, the author's statement at the top of page 145 relating
to the requirement of a state agency to control local government finance is not
now appropriate, for the General Assembly deleted this clause.
at 142.
10Ibid.
1
tIbid. at 142.
t Ibid. at 144-146.
1 Query, is Kornegay v. Goldsboro, 180 N. C. 441, 105 S. E. 187 (1920) still
to control? That case held that similar language in ART. VIII, §4 of the
present Constitution did not invalidate a statute authorizing municipalities in
Wayne County to sell bonds at less than par. Notice that neither the Commission nor the General Assembly forbade local or special legislation in this
connection. In the Kornegay case the Court held that the requirement of
general laws in relation to local finance imposed only a moral obligation on
the legislature to refrain from special legislation.
' RpxoRT, ART. V, §4.
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deleted55 this, but left future legislatures free to continue and to
strengthen centralization in this connection.
MISCELLANEOUS

Executive and judicial salaries are made subject 56 to "tax levies
common to others" as an exception to the provision that these compensations shall neither be increased nor diminished during their
terms of office. Members of the General Assembly are made ineligible during the time for which they were elected for appointment
to any civil office under the authority of the State, which shall have
been created or whose emoluments shall have been increased during
their period of service. 57
Absentee voting was limited by the Commission 58 to "persons
physically disabled or absent from home in the service of the State or
of the United States". The General Assembly59 changed this to read:
"persons physically disabled or absent from the county in which they
are entitled to vote."
The old Constitution is continued in force as statute 6° law by the
clause that "the provisions of the prior Constitution and its amendments not embodied herein shall, except as inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution, remain in force as statutory law, subject
to the power of the General Assembly to repeal or modify any or
all of them."
That the power of the General Assembly is limited only by constitutional restrictions is clarified by a new last section in the Bill of
Rights :61 "This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to limit
or restrict other rights of the people not mentioned in this article ;"
and by the first sentence of the first section in the article dealing with
the legislative department :62 "The legislative authority, which shall
be full and complete except as limited in this Constitution, shall be
vested in two distinct branches, both dependent on the people, to wit,
a Senate and a House of Representatives." Under the last section
of the Bill of Rights of the old Constitution there had been some
doubt 63 as to whether the legislature was not operating under a grant
of powers because of the clause: "This enumeration of rights shall
'ART. V,
'ART.
t

§4.

III, §15; ART. IV, §12.

'ART. IL §22.
'REPORT, ART. VI, §1.

'ART. VI, §1.
WART. XII, §3.
1 ART. I, §34.
"ART. II, §1,

' See Van Hecke, Legislative Power in North Carolina (1923)
L. REv. 172.

1 N. C.
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not be construed to impair 'or deny others retained by the people; and
all powers not herein delegated remain with the people."
CONCLUSION

The closing paragraphs of the address 4 on the same subject delivered before the North Carolina State Bar Association last summer
by Judge John J. Parker of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, and a Republican member of the Constitutional Commission,
constitute a fitting conclusion for this paper. With very nearly all
that he says the present writer finds himself in full accord.
"There are other important changes proposed by the new Constitution which I have not time to dwell upon-changes providing for
unified control of the educational system and the more effective administration of the State's charities and its developmental program.
I have covered only those which I deem of fundamental importance
and which in my judgment not only justify, but make it a matter
of supreme importance, that the new Constitution be adopted by the
voters of the State.
"In saying this, I would not have you misunderstand me. I would
have made a great many more changes than the proposed Constitution
makes. I would have changed the constitutional requirements as to
jury trial, so as to improve the efficiency of our courts of justice by
permitting a verdict upon less than a unanimous vote of the jurors in
all except capital cases. I would have abolished the antiquated system
of rotation of Superior Court Judges so as to center responsibility for
the administration of justice in each judicial district in the Judge resident in that district. I would have required a two-thirds vote of the
Legislature to override a gubernatorial veto. I would have permitted
the Governor to be elected for more than one term so that the people
might have the benefit of his experience in office if they desired it. I
would have centered the power and responsibility of the executive
department in the Governor by permitting him to appoint the members
of his official family, as the President does. To my mind the new Constitution ought to do all of these things. It does none of them. But
I am going to support it, not because I think it ideal, but because I
think it a tremendous improvement over the present Constitution.
"Let me urge that you approach the study of the proposed Constitution in the same spirit of compromise in which I make this statement. All great improvements in government have resulted from
" Supra note 17, at 147.
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this sort of compronise. We must respect the views of those who
differ from us and work with them to produce a plan on which all
may unite. If every man insists that the fundamental law incorporate all of his ideas, no Constitution could ever be adopted or amended.
The work of compromise, of adjustment of ideas, has been done by
the Commission and by the General Assembly. The instrument submitted is a great constructive improvement over the present Constitution. It strikes the shackles from the Legislature and makes it
possible for the people's representatives to work out an enlightened
taxing- system for the State, which will encourage agriculture, forestry and home ownership and promote honesty in the administration of
the tax laws. It gives greater power to the Governor in guiding the
policies of government, and makes him in truth the leader of the
people in directing the State's affairs. It unifies our judicial system
under the supervision of the Chief Justice and places in the hands of
the judiciary the regulation of procedure in the courts. And, last
but not least, it makes possible the revamping of local government
along lines of economy and efficiency. I commend it to every foiward
looking citizen of the State."

